The DFKI conducts application-oriented basic research in the field of artificial intelligence and other related subfields of computer science . The overall goal is to construct systems with technical knowledge and common sense which -by using AI methods -implement a problem solution for a selected application area. Currently, there are the following research areas at the DFKI : The DFKI strives at making its research results available to the scientific community. There exist many contacts to domestic and foreign research institutions, both in academy and industry. The DFKI hosts technology transfer workshops for shareholders and other interested groups in order to inform about the current state of research .
Introduction
In many cases, default information expresses properties of (almost all) individuals of a given class. Thus "Birds normally can fly" speaks about a default property of the class of all birds, and not about the individual bird Tweety.
On the technical level, in Reiter's Default Logic [11] , this means that most of the "naturally" occurring defaults are so-called open defaults, i.e., default rules with free variables. The standard birds-example is described by the rule bi' rd( x) : Ily( x) fly (x) which contains the free variable x. On the other hand, Reiter's definition of an extension-which describes the semantics of a default theory-makes sense only if considered for closed defaults.
To bridge this gap, Reiter assumes that open defaults stand for all their ground instances. The aim is to apply defaults not only to individuals that are explicitly given by ground terms, but also to those implicitly present because of the theory. Thereforp., Reiter proposes to Skolemize the world description (i.e., the facts one starts with) and the consequents of defaults before building ground instances. For example, if we have a default that says that doctors normally a1'e 1'ich, and if we know that Torn has a child that is a doctor, we should like to conclude that Torn has a rich child, as long as we know nothing to the contrary. But to apply the default to Tom's child, we need a ground term that stands for this child. This ground term is generated by Skolemization.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the Skolemization step has the very unpleasant effect that the consequence::; of a default theory may depend on the -'for-free ( x) that expresses that, normally, nothing is for free. Together with a world description that does not imply the existence of a counterexample, one cannot conclude Vx. -'for-free(x), even though -,[or-[ree(t) follows by default for each ground term t. 3 To OH'rCOIl1t' t.his problf'lll, Lifschit.z proposes a modification of default logic ill which fr('(' variab lf's at'f' 1101. trf'at.p.d as metavariables for ground terms. In principle, he considf'rs models of different cardinality separately, and fixes t.he universe for a given cardinalit.y. Then he introduces new object constants representing all element.s of the universe, and instantiates the defaults with t.hese new const.ants. Since the new constants are assumed to represent all element.s of the universe, one can now deduce some universally quantified formulae by default. However, as we shall show in Section 2, this way of proceeding also has some strange effects. In addition, it does not handle defaults wit.h prerequisites in the same way as defaults without. From the standard birds-default, together with a world description that does not imply t.he exist.ence of a counterexample, one still cannot conclude \fx. bird(x) --t fly(x) by default. For simi lar reasons, the problem of applying defaults to implicit individuals is not solved, i.e., in the doctors-example from above one cannot deduce that Tom has a rich child.
In the present paper we shall propose a new treatment of open defaults that tries to avoid the above mentioned problems of previous approaches. We shall restrict our attention to normal defaults, i.e., defaults where the justification and the consequent are identical. Open normal defaults will not be instantiated by ground terms or new object constants, but will be used to define a preference relation on the models of the world description. To move t.o a "better" (or preferred) model we will sometimes have to change the cardinality of the universe of the model, which means that we do not consider models of different cardinality separately. Unlike the usual approaches to preferential semantics we cannot always take the best models to construct our semantics. The reason is that we may get infinite chains of models that become better and better. Instead of dismissing such a chain because it contains no opt.imal model we will consider something like the limit (i.e., end segments) of the chain .
The definition of this new approach is given in Section 3, and illustrated by examples in Section 4. In Section 5 we shall show that the nonmonotonic consequence operator we get has "nice" proof-theoretic properties such as cumulativity. A default theory is a pair (W, V) where W is a set of closed first-order formulae (the world descript.ion) and V is a set of defaul t rules. A default theory is closed iff a ll its default rules are closed.
Intuitively, a closed default rul e can be appli ed, i.e. , it.s consequent is added to the curren t set of beliefs, if its prerequisite is already belie\'ed and its justification is consistent with the set of beliefs. Formally, the consequences of a closed default theory are defined with reference to the notion of an extension, which is a set of closed first-order formulae defined by the following fixed point construct ion. To overcome this problem, Lifschitz does not in stantiate defaults by ground terms, but by new "parameters," of which he assumes that t.hey cover the whole universe, considering models of different card inality separately. For a given cardinality, he defines the notion of an extension by a fixed point definition, which is a model-theoretic variant of Reiter's prooftheoretic definition.
Definition 2.1 (Reiter extensions) Let
More formally, let (W, V) be a (possibly open) default theory, and let U be a nonempty set (the universe). Lifschitz extends the language by new object constants representing all elements of U. For a set V of models of W with universe U , Th*(V) denotes the closed formulae (of the extended language) that ar<'~ true in all elements of V. The restriction of T1J*(V) to the original language is then denoted by Th(V). 
Default consequences are then defined in a skeptical way by taking the intersect ion of all U-extensions for all nonempty sets U. Obviously, it is enough to cons ider one set U for each cardinality.
In Example 2.4, Lifsch itz's approach yields the formula Vx. Q(x) as a default consequen ce sin ce the default can be applied for all new constants, and it is assumed that these constants cover the whole universe U. If the world description contains a counterexample-e.g., vV' = {...,Q ( a )}-the approach still allows one to get universally quantified formulae as default consequences-
Lifschitz shows that for normal defaults without prerequisites there is a close connection betweeu the approach presented above and circumscription. We shall now argue that for defaults with prerequisites Lifschitz 's approach is stil l not totall y satisfactory.
One problem is tbat in Example 2.2 , where we considered the single default P(x) : Q( x)/ Q( x) and the world description W = {3 x . P( x )} , one still cannot conclude 3x. Q( x) by default. The reason is that-because of the existential formula-in all models of W with universe U one of the new constants is in P , but for different models this may be the case for different constants. This means that we do not get P( c) E Th-(W) for any of the new constants, and thus ~(W) = W. This argument also shows t.hat one does not get the universal formula Another-sometimes unpleasant-behaviour of this approach comes from the fact that different cardinalities are considered separately. The effect is that cardinality formulae are treated differently from other formulae. For the empty \\'orld description. Olle might expect that one can conclude 3~1 by default . This is the case if we use Reiter's approach for closed default theories. In fact. 3::;1 ca n consistent I!' be assumed since t here is a model (of the empty theory) of cardinalit!· l. Thus the default call be applied. Ho\\·e,·er. with Lifschit z's approach the default is not applicable for uniwrses U of cardillalit~· greater than 1. and since one takes the intersection of all U-extensions. 
A Sell1antics for Open N orlnal Defaults
The rest.riction to normal defaults is just.ified by the fact that these arc the most natural types of default. rules. The main reason for llsing Ilon-Ilormal defa ul ts is that they call somet. i mes encode priori t. ies bet \\'een (ot hl'r\\'isl' The aim of t.he modified preferent.ial semantics presented below is to 0\'('1'-come the problems of previous approaches t.hat. we have point.ed out. aho\'('. Thus the new approach should he able to handle default.s wit.h prerequisit.cs such that it is possible 1. to derive exist.entially quant.ified formulae from ot.her exist.ent.ially quantified formulae by default,
As we have seen in the previous section, an approach that instantiates defaults by new object constants or ground terms, without Skolemizing existential quantifiers, is problematic with respect to the first requirement . For this reason we will not consider defaults as schemata for certain instantiated defaults. Instead they will be used to define a preference relation on the models of the world description. Intuitively speaking, a model M2 will be better than M} with respect to a given default d if M2 contains "less counterexamples" to d than M}. To satisfy the third requirement from above, we cannot assume that the models we compare have the same universe. Nevertheless, we assume that all universes are subsets of a given class, and that universes of different models are not necessarily disjoint. In the following, we are not interest.ed in set-theoretic niceties. Thus we shall frequently talk about sets of models even though these will most probably only be classes.
Before we can give a formal definition of the preference relation, we have to introduce some notation. An open normal default d = a : (3/(3 will be written as a(;!<.): (3(;£)/(3(;£), where the tuple;£ = (x}, ... ,x n ) consists of the free variables occurring in a, (3 . Now let ;£ = (x}, ... , x n ) be a tuple of variables, and let </J be a formula having some of these variables as its free variables . Assume that M is a model with universe UM, and v is a valuation that replaces the Xi by the elements Ui of U M . We say that </J( U}, ... , un) To move t.o a preferred model we require that we do not lose any positive example, and that at least one negative example is changed into a positive one. However, these two conditions are not sufficient since it could still happen that, while changing one negative example into a positive one, we introduce a lot of new negative examples, by changing the universe or the interpretation of a. This would not capture the intuition behind the notion of a preferred model. For this reason we introduce a third condition that disallows the introduction of new negative examples. In general, this preference relation will not be antisymmetric, and even if it is antisymmetric there may be infinitely decreasing chains. Thus there may exist models of W that are not above a minimal model, and it may even be the case that there are no minimal models.
The usual treatment of preference relations (see, e.g., [14 , 7] ) is to consider just t.he minimal models. Thus a chain that does not end in a minimal model is completely di sregarded by this kind of semantics, and the non-ex istence of minimal models is treated as an inconsistency. In Section 4 we shall give examples that demonstrate that this is not the adequate way to treat our preference relation. For this reason we shall defin e a modified preferential semantics that does not disregard infinitely decreasing chains. Instead it takes something like their limit by considering all end segments. 
A is >-dense in S iff it is both >-compiete and > -closed in S.
If it is clear from the context we will often omit the prefix>.
For example, if S is just an infinitely decreasing chain with respect to >, then dense sets are exactly the end segments of the chain.
The role of minimal models in normal preferential semantics is now taken over by dense sets. If every model of W lies above some minimal modeP then the set of minimal models is dense . Moreover, any dense set must contain all minimal models. This shows that in this case our modified preferential semantics coincides with the usual approach of taking minimal models.
The definition of a preferential semantics based on dense sets makes sure that the nonmonotonic consequence relation has nice proof-theoretic properties. For example, one can only deduce contradictory information if W was already inconsistent. This and other properties of the consequence relation will be considered in Section 5. But before proving these abstract properties we shall give concrete examples in the next section.
Examples
The purpose of this section is to give examples that motivate the way our preferential semantics was defined . In particular, they will demonstrate that the three requirements stated at the beginning of the previous section are met by our approach. In the following, P, Q will always be unary predicate symbols, :c, y variable symbols, and b, c constant symbols.
The first example shows that our approach can be considered as a skeptical one: from contradictory defaults we do not draw default conclusions.
lThis property is called smooth in [7] or stoppered in [10] .
Example 4.1 [contradictory defaults] defaults: d 1 = : P(x)/P(x), d 2 = : -,P( :r;)/-, P( x).
world description: empty.
The only consequences we get are the classical consequences of the (empty) world description, i.e., the valid closed formulae. The reason is that the only dense set is the set of all models of W = 0 itself. This is an easy consequence of the definition of dense sets and the fact that Ml >-M2 implies M2 >-MI. To show this fact. it is enough to prove that Ml >-d 1 M2 implies M2 >-Ml (the claim follows by symmetry and induction). Thus assume that Ml >-d 1 
M2
As illustrat.ed in Figure 1 , t.his means that at least one of the negative examples for d 1 in Ml (i.e., element.s of -,P) is a positive example for ri l in M2 (i.e., an element of P). Some 
(x) : -,P(:c)j-,P(.1:).
world description: arbitrary.
Here the consequences of the default theory are again just the classical consequences of the world description, but for another reason.
Obviously, there cannot be any positive example for d. Thus it is not possible to satisfy t.he first condition in the definition of d-preference, which means that no model can be d-preferred over another model. This shows that, again, the set of all models of the world description is the only dense s~.
0
The next four examples consider a default that says "normally all individuals are in P" with varying world descriptions. The first of these examples demonstrates that, as in Lifschitz's approach, one can derive universally quantified formulae by default. A model where all elements of the universe are in P is minimal with respect to >-d because it contains no negative examp les. In addition, any model where -,p is not empty can be modified to a d-preferred model where all elements of the universe are in P. Thus the set of minimal models is dense, and any dense set must contain all minimal models. Obviously, t.he formula Vx. P(x) holds in all minimal models.
If the world description implies that there is a counterexample for the default, one can no longer derive that all elements are in P. But as in Lifschitz's approach one can deduct" t. hat all elements different from the counterexample are in P. This example demonstrates why the third cond ition in the definition of d-preference is necessary. Assume that d-preference was defined just using the first and the second cond it ion. Then one could move from a model having exactly one element in -,p to a better one by first putting this one element 15 into P. and then augmenting the uniwrse by a new element that is put int o -P . It is eas:-' to see that thi" \\'ay one would deduce by default all formulae saying that the uni\'erse contains at least n elements (for each cardinality n).
\\' hile these formulae are no desirable default consequences in the abo\'e example. one shou ld like to deduce them (for finite cardinaliti es) in the next example .
Example 4.5 [P becomes infinite by default] defaults: d= :P(:r) / P (r).
world description: For each finitp cardinality n a formula saying that the existence of n elements in P implies the existence of n + 1 elements in tlw uni\·erse.
Obviollsly, a model of the world descript ion where all elements of the universe are in P must be infinit e. Since such a model contains no negative examples, it is >-.-t-minimal. In addition, any model in which -,p is not empty can be modifipd to an infinite d-prefelTPcl model where -,p is empty.
All the minimal models satisfy Vx. P(x) and, for all finite cardinalities n, all formulae say ing that the llni verse contains at least n elements. 0
If t he world description impli es the ex istence of infinitely many elements of -,P, a default that says that normally all elements are in P should allow one to derive that P is also infinite. The next example shows that our approach sat isfies this requirement.
Example 4.6 [infinitely many cOllnterexampleJ defaults: d = : P( :I;)/ P( :r; ).
world description: For each finite card inality n a formula saying that -,p contains at least n elements.
For all fillit e cardinaliti es n, the formula saying that P has at least n elements is a defallit CO li sequence of this theory. To prove this it is enough to show that the set of all models of the world description for which P is infinite is a dense set . world description : 3.r. P( .I"). He('all tllc\'t. wit.h Lifscllit.z's appl'oach t1lf'se COIISf'qUf'llces could not be obt.ailwd. 0 III 1.11(' presell('!' of ,) cOIlIlt.er('xamplf' , f' .g. , if t.hf' world df'scription consist.s of 1.11(' formlll" 3.1'. (1'(.1") 1\ -,Q(:I')) , olle call st.ill df'ducf' an appropriate ullivf'rsally qllallt.ifin\ forll1l1\a , lIaIlw\y
But. t.he (' xisl.cllt.ial forll1l1la 3.1". (2(.1") call 110 \ollgf'l' be obt.ained. This is l'f'asonahk sillce P ('ollld have just. 0111' elf'Illf'Ilt., which t.hf'n must. be in -,Q .
Howf'ver, if t.he world descriptioll cont.ains an addit.iona l fOl'mula saying that P has mol'(' t.hall Ollf' (-'\('11]('111., w(' agaill gf't.
3.t' . Q(.I").

I~ ~ {
It should be noted that in Example 4.7 one would get the same result if the formula 3:r:. P(;c) was replaced by P( b) for a constant b. In particular, in the presence of a counterexample, one would not conclude Q(b) because b could be this counterexample. This shows that our approach does not assume that named individuals (i.e., individuals described by ground terms) are more normal than other individuals. This assumption is, however, made by approaches that instantiate defaults with ground terms.
To show that our approach does not treat cardinality formulae differently from other types of formulae, we reconsider Example 2.6. The default d is a closed default. Thus there is only one example, the O-tuple,2 which is either positive or negat.ive, depending on whether the universe has cardinality 1 or greater cardinality. For this reason, any model of cardinality 1 is d-preferred to any model of cardinality greater than 1, and the models of cardinality 1 are incomparable with each other. This shows that 3~1 IS a default consequence. o Our final example demonstrates that not only information on the cardinality of models can be deduced by default, but also new equalities between constants. The reason is that the interpretation of constant or function symbols can be changed when moving to a preferred model.
Example 4.9 [new equalities by default]
defaults: : P(:r;)/P( ;c).
world description: -,P(b) 1\ -,P(c).
By an argument as in Example 4.4 on can show that the formula
is a default consequence of this theory. Together with the world description this formula implies that b = c.
This consequence seems to be reasonable since band c are counterexamples for the default. To keep the number of counterexamp les as small as possible, the best one can do is to identify b with c (as long as there is no information to the contrary), and thus have only one counterexample instead of two.
Proof-Theoretic Properties
The modified preferential approach we have presented in Section 3 satisfies most. of the proof-t.heoretic properties considered by Gabbay [5] , Makinson
[9], and Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [7] . It. should be Hot.ed that. this does not really deppnd on t.he s])f'cific preferE'llcp rplat.ion >-defined in Sectioll :3 .
The mai n reason for thp propertips t.o hold is our usp of >--dense sets for defining t.he 1l0nmonOLonic COIlspquencp relation. This provides use with all the properties satisfied by tllP usual preferential approaches. In addition, our approach satisfies cau I.ious monot.ollY, and thus cUll1u lati vi ty (wi thoul. an addit.ional smoothllps:; condition) because millimal models arp replaced by dense sets.
The properties are usually formula.ted as rules for a IlOIlJl10JIOLOllic COllsequence relation f-v. III our context, t.his relation is defiued as follows. The first property, right weakening, is obvious. In fact, , r-a means that there is a dense set A in the set of all models of , such that all elements of A satisfy a. Since a ---t fJ is valid, this formula holds in all elements of A. Thus fJ also holds in all elements of the dense set A.
The second property, refle.7:ivity follows from the fact that the set of all models of a is dense in itself.
To show right and, we need the following property of dense sets. Now a r-fJ means that there is a >--dense set A in the set of all models of a such that fJ is satisfied in all elements of A. Analogously, a r-, means that there is a >--dense set B in the set of all models of a such that , is satisfied in all elements of B. But then fJ /\ , is satisfied in all elements of An B, and this set is >--dense by the lemma. Thus we have shown that our nonmonotonic consequence relation satisfies the "right and" property. This property implies t hat one can only conclude contradictory information by default if the precondition is already inconsistent. In fact, assume that (3 and I are contradictory, i.e., (3/\, is inconsistent. From a r-(3 and a r-, one can conclude a r-(3 t", by "right and." But this means that there exists a dense set A in the set 5 of all models of a such that the (inconsistent) formula (3/\ I holds in all elements of A. Obviously, this is only possible if A is empty. But then 5 mU8t. be empty as well since otherwise the empty set A could not be complete in 5 .
The lejt 01' property iti an easy consequence of the next lemma. To show the "left or" property, assume that a r--, and (3 r--1. By 51 we denote the set of all models of a, and by 52 the set of all models of (3. Obviously, 51 U 52 is the set of all models of a V (3. Now a r--, ((3 r--,) means that there exists a >--dense set Al in 51 (A2 in 52) such that, holds in all elements of Al (A2)' The lemma yields a set B ~ Al U A2 that is >--dense in 51 U 52, the set of all models of a V (3. Obviously, , holds in all elements of B. This completes the proof that the "left or" property is satisfied by our nonmonotonic consequence relation.
Left logical equivalence is trivially satisfied. In fact, if a and (3 are logically equivalent then they have the same set of models.
To show Cfl'lltiov,s monotony, we need another simple property of dense sets. If A is not >-closed in B then there exists a E A and h E B \ A with a > b. Since B ~ 5 we get h E 5 \ A, which shows that A is not >-closed in
5.
0 Now assume that a r--(3 and ()' r--f. Let 5 be the set of all models of a, and let B be the set of all models of a 1\ (3. Now a r--(3 (a r--,) yields a >--dense set A1 (A 2 ) in 5 such that fJ (r) holds in all elements of Al (A2)' By Lemma ,5.:3 we kuow that A1 n A2 is >--dense in 5. Obviously, a 1\ (3 holds in all elements of A1 n A 2 . Thus AJ n A2 ~ B, and by Lemma 5.5 Al n A2 is dense in B. Since, holds in all elements of AJ n A 2 , we get a 1\ fJ r--,. This completes the proof that "cautions monotony" holds for our non monotonic consequence relation.
The next example demonstrates that mtiorwl monotony is not always satisfied (as was to be expected).
Example 5.6 We consider the fixed set of defaults V = { : P(x)/P(x)}.
The closed formulae 0', (3" 
Conclusion
In the approach for handling open normal defaults pn= ·sented in t his paper the defaults of a given default. t.heory induce a preference relat.ion >-bet.ween models of its world description. We have showll by examples t.hat this avoids some of the drawbacks of approaches that view open defaults as schemata for cert.ain illstantiatiollS.
Differing from the u:;ual preferential approaches, our 1I0nJl1onotonic COllsequence relation is not defined with reference to >--minimal models. Instead we have introduced the lIotion of >--dense sets. In Section 5 it was shown that, because of this modified preferent.ial approach, our nonmonotonic consequence relation has most. of the "nice" proof-theoretic properties mentiolled by Gabbay [5] , Makinsoll [9], awl Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [7J. An interesting problem for furt.her research in t.his directioll is to establish an exact correspondence bet.ween proof-tIleord,ic properties and om lIew preferential approach, similarly to the results of Krau:;, Lehmallll, and Magidor [7J and Schlecht a [13J for the usual preferent.ial approaches.
In the present. paper, we did not take priorities among defaults int.o ac- In Example 4.1, where we considered contradictory defaults d 1 , d 2 , this approach would solve the conflict if one gives one of the defaults higher priority. In fact , one would get the same consequences as if only the default with higher priority was present. However, it is a subject of furthe~ research to examine this t.reatment of priorities among open defaults more closely.
